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SEEING VOICES:  POTENTIAL NEUROSCIENCE 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A RECONSTRUCTION 
OF LEGAL INSANITY 
Jane Campbell Moriarty* 
 
Nurses working at a community hospital ward in a poor section of the 
city were both frustrated and irritated with their middle-aged female patient 
and were ready to put her in physical restraints.1  The patient had been 
admitted for attempting to harm herself.  She refused to comply with the 
nurses’ requests, behaving belligerently and repeatedly throwing herself on 
the floor.  In a hospital that serves many homeless, drug-addicted, mentally 
ill, and violent patients, this troublesome woman was a particular challenge 
in a day filled with difficult patients.  And, after several hours, the nurses’ 
empathy for their patient was waning. 
The psychiatrist on staff that day was new to the job, although not new to 
psychiatric work.  He had given up his long-standing and very successful 
private and forensic practice to return to practicing psychiatry in a city 
hospital that often received the most difficult and treatment-resistant 
mentally ill patients.  This job was similar to the work he did when first out 
of his residency with an ivy-league degree and no fear of spending 
eighteen-hour days in a hospital psych ward.  But now, of course, he was 
returning with decades of experience and access to new forms of 
neuroimaging and psychotropic drugs that did not exist when he first began 
practice.  As he returned to hospital work, he was finding the work 
fascinating, exhausting, intense, and, most critically, valuable. 
 
*  Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship and Professor of Law, Duquesne 
University School of Law.  Special thanks to Professor Deborah W. Denno and Fordham 
University School of Law for the terrific symposium in February 2016, Criminal Behavior 
and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide, for which this article was written.  
Versions of this article were presented at Stetson Law School, University of Akron School of 
Law, and at the Mon River Faculty Colloquium, composed of faculty from Duquesne 
University School of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and West Virginia 
School of Law.  Thanks to all for helpful comments.  Thanks to Daniel Langleben, Michael 
Perlin, Bruce Ledewitz, and Lee Gutkind for helpful comments on drafts.  Many thanks to 
Duquesne University School of Law for supporting this research and to Marcus Lipinski 
(J.D., 2016) and Rachel Matson (J.D., 2017) for research assistance and the Fordham Law 
Review for their excellent work on this project.  For an overview of the symposium, see 
Deborah W. Denno, Foreword:  Criminal Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and 
Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016).  For Gary~rest in peace, my love. 
 
 1. The following account comes from two interviews with a neuropsychiatrist who 
requested anonymity.  The first was an in-person interview in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on 
February 13, 2016 and the second was a telephone interview on July 12, 2016. 
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After listening to the nurses’ concerns about this particular patient and 
observing her behavior, however, he had a suspicion and ordered a CT scan 
of the patient’s brain.  He reviewed the scans and immediately saw the 
damage and tissue loss in the patient’s prefrontal cortex, likely from a prior 
stroke.  When he discussed the scan results with the nurses, he saw their 
faces soften and realized they now saw her not as a rotten person but as a 
very ill patient.2  This state of mind and emotion, where we shift from 
blaming a person for behavior to potentially excusing her, is where the 
historical origins of the insanity defense reside within us.  At root, opinions 
about blameworthiness and mental illness are guided by an internal moral 
compass and are critical to our shared notions of justice.3 
The change in how the nurses thought about the patient was not due to a 
physician’s clinical diagnosis or opinion based on the patient’s behavior.  It 
was the information from the image of an injured brain that affected how 
the nurses thought about her blameworthiness.  We cannot discount the 
effect on a decision that a reliable, science-based image can provide—
whether an x-ray of a broken leg, a photograph of a severe injury, or a 
structural or functional image of the brain—or even the effect of being 
informed about that image.  Accurate, relevant neuroimaging data (coupled 
with explanations) that relate to legal insanity might be helpful and lead to 
 
 2. Whether brain damage or trauma is causally related to behavior, of course, is a 
serious question in any given case and for neuroscience and criminal law generally.  While 
there are reasons to believe that brain trauma and injury might be implicated in aberrant 
behavior, as explained later in this Article, simply blaming the brain for behavior is both 
overly simplistic and potentially misleading.  The prefrontal lobe damage in this case may 
have been causally related to the behavior of the patient or not; she may just have been a 
very difficult person.  Correlation is not causation, and current imaging does not prove the 
relationship between a given brain abnormality and behavior. See Walter Glannon, The 
Limitations and Potential of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Law, 18 J. ETHICS 153, 155 
(2014).  The relationship between neuroimaging and aberrant behavior is the subject of much 
commentary. See, e.g., C.C. Meltzer et al., Guidelines for the Ethical Use of Neuroimages in 
Medical Testimony:  Report of a Multidisciplinary Consensus Conference, 35 AM. J. 
NEURORADIOLOGY 632, 632 (2013) (noting the difficulty of making inferences about human 
behavior from functional neuroimaging); Jane C. Moriarty, Daniel D. Langleben & James 
M. Provenzale, Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic Complexity, 31 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
702, 707 (2013) (discussing the complicated relationship between brain and behavior, and 
arguing that the weight of commentary does not support the neuroimaging as a direct link to 
behavior).  For an excellent discussion on the historical and contemporary problems of 
linking violent behavior to physiognomy and brain structure, see Amanda Pustilnik, Violence 
on the Brain:  A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 
(2009). 
 3. “These shared intuitions of justice can reveal much about the way people 
conceptualize behavior, blame, and punishment. . . .  [T]hese intuitions tell us what it means 
to hold someone blameworthy and not just responsible.” Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the 
Brain, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 59–60 (2010).  For more on the concept of 
blameworthiness in criminal law, see generally, Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally 
Blameless:  Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992) (providing an in-depth analysis of the foundations of legal and 
moral blame and the complexities of that relationship).  For more on blameworthiness and 
legal insanity, see generally Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense:  
Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 289 (1998); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity:  Recasting the Role of Mental 
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000). 
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more rationally premised decision making.4  For example, if functional 
neuroimaging could accurately visualize an auditory verbal hallucination 
(AVH) that a person with schizophrenia endures, legal insanity might be a 
more understandable and, indeed, a more palatable concept.  Perhaps 
“seeing voices” could improve the rationality of decision making about 
legal insanity.5  Moving away from purely behavioral-science based expert 
opinions to opinions more firmly grounded in neurological or biological 
evidence may be a critical step. 
Radiographic images of brain anatomy (“structural images”) are widely 
used in medicine where behaviors may be correlated with conditions such 
as strokes and neurodegenerative disorders.6  Additionally, some forms of 
functional neuroimaging are also useful in medicine.  For example, one type 
of positron emission tomography, 18 FDG PET, a functional technique that 
captures glucose metabolism, is routinely used in diagnosing brain tumors 
and Alzheimer’s disease.7 
The legal system embraces these structural and functional imaging 
methods for many diagnostic purposes, given their long-recognized role in 
medicine for these purposes.8  Using structural and functional imaging to 
explain criminal behavior, however, raises more complicated questions, 
including whether behavior can be reduced to brain states and whether 
complex decisions involving cognition and behaviors can be accurately 
imaged. 
Given the largely negative and stereotyped beliefs that have long fueled 
legislative, judicial, and jury decisions about the insanity defense,9 accurate 
 
 4. Studies looking at neuroimaging, neuroscience, and decision making by mock jurors 
suggest it is not the images themselves that are terribly persuasive, but the “entire package of 
neuroevidence,” including the science-based testimony. N.J. Schweitzer & M.J. Saks, 
Neuroimaging Evidence and the Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 592, 604 (2011). 
 5. Researchers are developing neuroimaging to visualize auditory verbal hallucinations. 
See generally Renaud Jardri et al., Cortical Activations During Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations in Schizophrenia:  A Coordinate-Based Meta-Analysis, 168 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 73 (2011) (analyzing multiple PET and fMRI studies and discussing the 
findings of increased activation in clusters of the brain that occur when patients with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders experience AVH); see also Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 
4, at 604 (suggesting from their study data that “framing mental illness in biological or 
neurological terms works to remove some skepticism on the part of jurors by making the 
underlying mechanism of the mental illness more concrete”). 
 6. Melissa Lamar et al., Dementia, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM 
THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 67, 69–71 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012) (discussing the use 
of structural neuroimaging in diagnosing various forms of dementia); see also Erin D. Bigler 
et al., MRI and Functional MRI, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM THE 
CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra, at 27, 27 (noting that CT is “is the most powerful method 
of showing the mechanism and acuteness” of acute-onset brain injuries such as stroke). 
 7. Susan E. Rushing, Daniel A. Pryma & Daniel D. Langleben, PET and SPECT, in 
NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 
6, at 3, 20. 
 8. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility:  Neuroimaging Evidence in the 
U.S. Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 29, 40 (2008) (collecting cases and concluding that “MRI 
and CT . . . are well-accepted as reliable forms of scientific evidence to show that a party has 
brain damage, injury, or illness.”). 
 9. See generally MICHAEL J. PERLIN, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 229–30 
(1993) (discussing the largely mythic beliefs that animate insanity defense jurisprudence, 
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structural and functional images might become an effective way in the 
future to provide a more realistic understanding of both mental illness and 
the effects of traumatic brain injury.  If such images are to be based upon 
robust scientific knowledge that supplements and confirms current 
psychiatric and psychological diagnoses, it may be possible to respond 
successfully to the damaging and inaccurate mythic beliefs that plague the 
insanity defense. 
By most accounts, the science is not yet there,10 but identifying genetic 
and brain-based biomarkers of serious mental illness is a robust area of 
research in multiple scientific disciplines.11  Moreover, neuroscience may 
help illuminate the relationship between cognition and behaviors, relevant 
both to defendants with mental illness and those with traumatic brain 
injuries caused by accidents, assaults, wars, and sports.12 
This Article focuses only on the conception of legal insanity in light of 
developing neuroscience; it does not make recommendations about 
courtroom evidence.  Much of the emerging functional neuroscience is not 
sufficiently reliable for the courtroom,13 a point I have made elsewhere.14  
 
including that the defense is “an abused, overpleaded and over-accepted ‘loophole’ . . . that 
most successful pleaders are not truly mentally ill; that most acquittals follow sharply-
contested ‘battle of the experts;’ [and] that most successful pleaders are sent for short stays 
to civil hospitals”). 
 10. See e.g., Stefan Borgwardt & Paolo Fusar-Poli, Third-Generation Neuroimaging in 
Early Schizophrenia:  Translating Research Evidence into Clinical Utility, 200 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 270, 270 (2012) (discussing some of the findings of schizophrenia neuroscience 
research in first and second generation studies but noting that “no consistent or reliable 
anatomical or functional alterations have been unequivocally associated with psychosis or 
schizophrenia and no clinical applications have been developed in psychiatric 
neuroimaging”); MICHAEL FIRST ET AL.,AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE 
APA WORK GROUP ON NEUROIMAGING MARKERS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 2 (2012) 
(explaining that neuroimaging studies have presented promising results, but “[c]urrently 
neuroimaging is not recommended within either the U.S. or European practice guidelines for 
positively defining diagnosis of any primary psychiatric disorder”); Meltzer et al., supra note 
2. 
 11. See generally Kerstin Bendfeldt et al., Classifying Individuals at High-Risk for 
Psychosis Based on Functional Brain Activity During Working Memory Processing, 9 
NEUROIMAGE 555 (2015); Nikolaos Koutsouleris et al., Individualized Differential Diagnosis 
of Schizophrenia and Mood Disorders Using Neuroanatomical Biomarkers, 138 BRAIN 2059 
(2015); Aswin Sekar et al., Schizophrenia Risk from Complex Variation of Complement 
Component 4, 530 NATURE 177 (2016); Kenneth Hugdahl et al. Auditory Hallucinations in 
Schizophrenia:  The Role of Cognitive, Brain Structural and Genetic Disturbances in the 
Left Temporal Lobe, FRONTIER HUM. NEUROSCIENCE (Mar. 28, 2008), http:// 
journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/neuro.09.006.2007/full [https://perma.cc/3LDG-
SJ2S]. 
 12. See also Joshua W. Buckholtz and David L. Faigman, Promises, Promises for 
Neuroscience and Law, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY (SPECIAL ISSUE) R861, R861–63 (2014) 
(discussing the potential “engagement between law and neuroscience” on the issue of self-
control and to illuminate mental states, including blameworthiness). 
 13. Despite the concerns many have about the admissibility of structural and functional 
neuroimaging, data suggest such evidence is admitted in a variety of ways. See Deborah W. 
Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword:  An Empirical Study of Neuroscience 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 505 (2015) (analyzing 800 cases 
addressing neuroscience over the course of two decades and concluding that “[i]n sum, the 
Neuroscience Study reveals a modern criminal justice system that is open to employing a 
wide range of neuroscience evidence”).  For more empirical data and analysis on the use of 
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Indeed, as other scholars explain in a recent article, law and neuroscience 
are not yet even speaking a common language that would permit them to 
meaningfully communicate in the area of self-control and criminal 
responsibility.15  With time, however, the law should be receptive to well-
developed science informing our conception of legal insanity. 
I suggest three ways that neuroscience might inform and possibly 
improve the concept of legal insanity.  First, it could ground existing 
psychiatric and psychological views of legal insanity in brain science that 
complements and possibly refines the traditional diagnoses based upon 
observations, physical examinations, and patient history.16  For example, 
scientists from multiple disciplines are working to understand the cause, 
development, and appropriate treatment of schizophrenia.17  These insights 
may provide what has been missing from the psychiatric diagnostic toolkit:  
reproducible, biological information about individuals with either mental or 
neurological illness or injury.  Such information may well provide a better 
way to distinguish between the responsible and mentally nonresponsible. 
Second, neuroscience may better illuminate the relationship between 
disordered thinking and aberrant behavior.  Statutes defining legal insanity 
often distinguish between cognition and volition, with few jurisdictions 
allowing the latter to serve as a defense.18  The debate about the proper role 
of cognition and volition in legal insanity has been reignited in the last 
decade in part due to legal cases involving (1) veterans returning from Iraq 
and Afghanistan who have been injured by explosions (“blast damage”) or 
have suffered other forms of traumatic brain injuries and (2) athletes 
suffering from chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) due to sport-related 
 
neuroscience evidence, see Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US 
Criminal Law:  An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 485 (2016) (evaluating the use of 
neurological and behavioral genetic evidence by criminal defendants in U.S. criminal cases 
and concluding that the use of such evidence is widespread on the increase), and Francis X. 
Shen, Neuroscience Evidence as Instant Replay, 3 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 1 (2016) (synthesizing 
empirical studies from four countries and concluding that the admission of neuroscience 
evidence appears to be on an upward trajectory). 
 14. See Daniel D. Langleben & Jane C. Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie 
Detection:  Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 222 
(2013); Jane Campbell Moriarty, supra note 8; Jane Campbell Moriarty, Visions of 
Deception:  Neuroimages and the Search for Evidential Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739 
(2009); Moriarty, Langleben & Provenzale, supra note 2. 
 15. See Joshua W. Bukholtz, Valerie Reyna & Christopher Slobogin, A Neuro-Legal 
Lingua Franca:  Bridging Law and Neuroscience on the Issue of Self-Control (Mental 
Health Law & Policy Journal, Working Paper No. 16-32, 2016) (explaining the dual 
languages of law and science and the need for a common language—a “lingua franca”—
about mental states relevant to criminal justice).  “[I]f the law’s normative preferences can 
be framed in a common language, scientists’ ability to operationalize legal concepts and 
produce legally relevant findings will be enhanced.” Id. at 4. 
 16. See Glannon, supra note 2, at 154 (noting that advanced imaging may “clarify 
whether an individual had or lacked control of her actions when behavioral criteria alone 
cannot answer this question”). 
 17. See generally supra note 11; infra notes 87–89. 
 18. See infra Parts I, III. 
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head injuries.19  The relationship between thought and behavior is the 
subject of much research, and neuroscience insights may eventually 
improve the understanding of this relationship. 
Third, neuroscience and research from other disciplines may converge to 
better inform our moral sense of blameworthiness.  As with the example of 
the nurses at the beginning of this Article, a deeper, more science-based 
understanding of mental illness and impairment may affect our moral 
decisions about blameworthiness—a helpful antidote to the last forty years 
of legislation aimed primarily at stopping defendants from “getting away 
with murder.”20 
Part I of this Article explains the insanity defense in the United States.  
Next, Part II discusses some of the brain-based research about mental 
illness, focusing on schizophrenia research.  Then, Part III looks at 
traumatic brain injury and the relationship among injury, cognition, and 
behavior.  Finally, Part IV explains how a new neuroscience-informed 
standard might better inform our moral decision making about legal 
insanity. 
I.  THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
Intuitively, we understand and accept that not all actors are equally 
blameworthy for their acts.  We believe toddlers are not blameworthy, as 
they have not yet developed moral reasoning or behavioral control.  We 
often hold adolescents to a lesser standard of responsibility than adults, 
understanding their less developed brains may lead them to make more 
impulsive and foolish decisions than adults.21  But in the legal evaluation of 
criminal defendants with mental illness, the distinction between 
blameworthy and excusable conduct is far more complex and fraught, as the 
last few hundred years prove.  Ideally, the insanity defense excuses 
defendants who, due to serious mental illness or injury, are not morally 
blameworthy.  While a verdict of legal insanity is informed by medical or 
psychological evidence, it is also a moral and humane judgment.22 
The insanity defense, although a part of Anglo-American jurisprudence 
for hundreds of years,23 has been much maligned.24  Its claimed 
 
 19. See, e.g., Symposium, Brain Science in the 21st Century:  Clinical Controversies 
and Ethical Implications, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 124 (2014); Symposium, Criminal 
Behavior and the Brain:  When Law and Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 
(2016); Symposium, Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, and the Criminal Justice System, 
8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2010). 
 20. For more on the importance of neuroscience to inform our moral sense of 
blameworthiness, see generally Theodore Y. Blumoff, Foreword:  The Brain Sciences and 
Criminal Law Norms, 62 MERCER L. REV. 705 (2011). 
 21. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005). 
 22. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 
194 (1983) (discussing the role of the insanity defense as an integral aspect of the moral 
foundation of criminal law). 
 23. See 1 THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS:  THE HISTORY OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES, at xi (Jane Campbell Moriarty ed., 2001) (discussing the 
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shortcomings are multifold:  the defense is based on antiquated and 
inaccurate concepts of mental illness,25 behavioral science diagnoses are 
claimed to be overly subjective,26 mental health professionals frequently 
disagree about whether a given individual is sufficiently mentally ill to be 
considered legally insane,27 politicians and prosecutors argue strenuously 
that the insanity defense allows defendants to “get away with murder,”28 
and many fear a legally insane defendant will be able to walk free after the 
verdict.29  In studies involving mock juries and public views of legal 
insanity, many participants did not believe that mental illness reduces an 
individual’s capacity for understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct.  
These jurors also believed that the mentally ill were equally blameworthy as 
others who committed crimes.30 
Leading insanity defense scholars have long argued that insanity defense 
jurisprudence has been in a “state of chaos”31 or that it is “incoherent.”32  
More recently, one scholar, noting multiple problems with the current state 
of the insanity defense argues that it may be “unraveling”—a position that 
certainly rings true.33  If the defense, infrequently invoked and rarely 
 
contributions of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Mathew Hale in the 1600s to the legal construction 
of the insanity defense). 
 24. See generally PERLIN, supra note 9. 
 25. Lisa Claydon, Are There Lessons to be Learned from a More Scientific Approach to 
Mental Condition Defences?, 35 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 88, 88 (2012) (“[T]he law lags 
behind psychiatric understanding, and this partly explains why in practice medical 
professionals do not apply the correct legal test.”).  This concern animates much of the 
reasoning for Judge David Bazelon’s well-known opinion in Durham v. United States, 214 
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), where he noted that the law of insanity was far behind 
developments in science, and he created a new test that defined insanity as “the product of 
mental disease or mental defect.” Id. at 874–75.  The Durham test, however, was abandoned 
in 1972 by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  Brawner was 
effectively overruled by the Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
 26. Nicole A. Vincent, A Compatibilist Theory of Legal Responsibility, 9 CRIM. L. & 
PHIL. 477, 479 (2015). 
 27. In a recent study conducted in Hawaii, where three independent experts 
(psychiatrists and psychologists) conducted independent evaluations of defendants in 165 
cases, the authors conclude that the rate of agreement about legal sanity among forensic 
evaluators was roughly 55 percent. See W. Neil Gowensmith, Daniel C. Murrie & Marcus T. 
Boccaccini, How Reliable Are Forensic Evaluations of Legal Sanity, 37 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 98, 103 (2012).  In that study, evaluators disagreed clearly in at least 35 percent of 
cases. See id.  This study’s conclusion differs sharply from previous studies cited therein but 
may be based on the fact that these cases required independent evaluations, which was not 
likely in prior studies. 
 28. PERLIN, supra note 9, at 24 n.53 (1993) (quoting Rudolph Guiliani,who claimed that 
getting away with murder occurs “in many, many insanity cases”). 
 29. See id. at 230. 
 30. See COREY J. VITELLO & ERIC W. HICKEY, THE MYTH OF A PSYCHIATRIC CRIME 
WAVE:  PUBLIC PERCEPTION, JUROR RESEARCH, AND MENTAL ILLNESS 97 (2006) (citing Caton 
F. Roberts, Stephen L. Golding & Frank D. Fincham, Implicit Theories of Criminal 
Responsibility:  Decision Making and the Insanity Defense, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 207 
(1987)). 
 31. See Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1199. 
 32. PERLIN, supra note 9, at 1. 
 33. R. George Wright, Pulling on the Thread of the Insanity Defense, 59 VILL. L. REV. 
221, 241 (2014) (arguing that the defense is in danger of unraveling due to legal, scientific, 
and jurisprudential reasons). 
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successful,34 is unraveling, the reasons are clear:  legislation either seriously 
restricts the defense35 or eliminates it entirely,36 the U.S. Supreme Court 
and state court decisions permit such legislation to stand,37 the public has a 
distaste for the defense,38 and there has been a national shift toward 
incarcerating those with mental illness.39  Additionally, the ongoing debates 
about free will and determinism may also be contributing to this 
unraveling.40 
 
 34. See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 594 (noting the infrequent use and even 
more infrequent success of the insanity defense).  The most memorable description of its 
poor success rate claims it is “rarer than poisonous snake bites in Manhattan.” Julian Eule, 
The Presumption of Sanity:  Bursting the Bubble, 25 UCLA L. REV. 637, 655 (1978). 
 35. See e.g., Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
 36. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (2012).  The Kansas statute eliminates the 
insanity defense and provides for an acquittal only if the defendant, “as a result of a mental 
disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the crime 
charged.” 
 37. See, e.g., State v. Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 888 (Mont. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. 
Cowan v. Montana, 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). 
 38. PERLIN, supra note 9, at 229. 
 39. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness:  
Rethinking Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 11 
(2014) (“In the [past] forty years, a revolution in criminal justice policies led to an enormous 
expansion of the prison population.  As prison sentences became less individualized through 
a variety of mechanisms—including determinate sentences, mandatory minimums, and 
prosecutorial discretion—unprecedented numbers of people with serious mental illness 
found themselves confined in prisons and jails.”); see also Steven Raphael & Michael A. 
Stoll, Assessing the Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth 
in the U.S. Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188 (2013) (discussing the 
precipitous rate of mental hospital inpatients after the 1960s and the fivefold increase in 
incarceration rates during the 1980s and 1990s and analyzing the relationship between those 
two dramatic changes).  While finding that the deinstitutionalization played a “relatively 
minor role” in incarceration increases, the authors conclude that “a sizable portion of the 
mentally ill behind bars would not have been incarcerated in years past.” Id. at 190; see also 
Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown Into Jail”:  Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to 
Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 
343 (2013). 
 40. Professor R. George Wright argues that debates about free will and determinism also 
contribute to the more philosophically premised concerns about moral agency. Wright, supra 
note 33, at 231–41.  While the debate about free will and determinism is robust in 
neuroscience and law, it is beyond the scope of this Article, although certainly relevant to the 
issue. See e.g., Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics:  The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of 
Neuroscience, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 571, 586 (2012) (questioning whether neuroscience 
knowledge claiming that our behavior is caused by brain processes will affect our views of 
ourselves as moral agents); Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience 
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 
1778 (2004); Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807 
(2014); John B. Meixner, Jr., Applications of Neuroscience in Criminal Law:  Legal and 
Methodological Issues, 15 CURRENT NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCIENCE REP. 513, 520 (2014) 
(referencing the vigorous debate among scholars in science, law, and philosophy about 
whether neuroscience might change the way we think about culpability, mens rea, and 
behavioral control); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal 
Responsibility:  A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Stephen J. Morse, 
Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology:  Two Challenges to Responsibility from 
Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 3, at 1222–27 
(discussing determinism and insanity); Vincent, supra note 26, at 481–82. 
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During this same period, however, neuroscience research (among other 
scientific disciplines) appears to be ascendant in the understanding, 
prediction, diagnosis, and treatment of mental illnesses, such as 
schizophrenia.41  Researchers are also trying to understand the cognitive 
and behavioral effects of traumatic brain injury caused by blast damage, 
sports, and accidents.42  It is thus an appropriate time, perhaps, to consider 
developing neuroscience research and whether it could inform a 
reconstruction of legal insanity going forward.43 
Given the fragmented and fraying state of the insanity defense, it may be 
overly optimistic to assume a reconstruction will follow.  Yet, moral 
blameworthiness is a deeply human concept we collectively and intuitively 
understand; we are unlikely to willingly jettison the concept of legal 
insanity entirely.44  Neuroscience, however, may help create a sturdier 
foundation for a reconstruction of legal insanity—in whatever form it 
takes.45  If developments in neuroscience provide information that 
substantively changes the way we think of serious mental illness—for 
example, as a disease process akin to type I diabetes that strikes in 
childhood and adolescence—we might radically restructure the concept of 
legal insanity in the criminal law field.46  It is possible that legal insanity 
could change from an affirmative defense to something more akin to a 
pretrial determination that results in confinement and treatment but not 
punishment.47 
Currently, the federal system and a majority of states use some variant of 
the mid-1800 “M’Naghten test,” a cognitively focused standard that 
 
 41. See infra Part II. 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. Professor Theodore Blumoff suggests that “[n]euroscience, behavioral genetics, and 
the brain sciences generally ought to be among the sources that routinely inform our 
jurisprudence far more than they do now.” Blumoff, supra note 20, at 725.  I agree with 
Professor Blumoff in theory but believe it may still be too early for such a hearty embrace. 
 44. Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorders and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 933 (2011) (arguing that “[t]here is no suitable alternative to legal 
insanity”).  Professor Michael Perlin agrees, noting that “we recognize that in some narrow 
and carefully circumscribed circumstances, exculpation is—and historically has been—
proper and necessary.” Michael J. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You from Me”:  
The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of 
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1379 (1997); accord, Bonnie, supra note 22, at 194. 
 45. How a reconstruction of legal insanity would develop is interesting but beyond this 
Article.  In Montana, for instance, when the insanity defense was abolished there was a 
marked increase in the number of defendants that courts found incompetent to be tried. See, 
e.g., Lisa A. Callahan, Pamela Clark Robbins, Henry J. Steadman & Joseph P. Morrissey, 
The Hidden Effects of Montana’s “Abolition” of the Insanity Defense, 66 PSYCHIATRY Q. 
103, 116 (1995) (discussing the increase in finding defendants incompetent to stand trial and 
the increase in charges being dismissed after that finding). 
 46. Scholars suggest that as neuroscience offers more precise accounts of the “physical 
processes that can lead to irresponsible or criminal behaviour, the public perception of 
responsibility” may change much the way viewpoints about addiction have shifted from a 
failure of character to a medical disease model. Andrea L. Glenn & Adrian Raine, 
Neurocriminology:  Implications for the Punishment, Prediction and Prevention of Criminal 
Behaviour, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 54, 59 (2014); see also Farah, supra note 40 
at 586. 
 47. See Blumoff, supra note 20, at 746. 
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considers whether an individual knows or appreciates the wrongfulness of 
his conduct due to serious mental illness or injury.48  Before 1980, however, 
“well over half the states” in the United States had adopted the American 
Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code test, which embraced a broader 
definition of legal insanity, including a volitional, as well as a cognitive 
prong.49  The test did not require the mental illness or defect to be “severe,” 
and permitted the defense to be used where the defendant could not 
“conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”50 
However, when John Hinckley Jr. shot both President Reagan and James 
Brady in March 1981 and was found not guilty by reason of insanity under 
the ALI test, insanity defense standards began changing rapidly.51  In 
response to the Hinckley’s acquittal, Congress enacted a much more limited 
test for insanity, as part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act52 (IDRA).  
IDRA restricted the insanity defense to those cases where the defendant, 
because of a severe mental illness or injury, was unable to distinguish right 
from wrong or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.  In addition to 
diminishing the scope of the defense, IDRA required the defendant to prove 
 
 48. The M’Naghten test dates back to the trial of Daniel M’Naghten in 1843. 
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718.  The original test was a cognitive-based test 
considering whether the defendant “was labouring under such a defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” Id. at 722.  For more on 
this case, see generally, RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG:  THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN (1981); PERLIN, supra note 9, at 78–84.  Moran notes, 
incidentally, that the accepted spelling of “M’Naghten” in U.S. courts is likely inaccurate; 
thus explaining the alternative spelling of the name in his book. MORAN, supra, at xiii. 
 49. Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:  
Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates 
Trial, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 318 (2003). 
 50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 
1985).  The “Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility,” provision reads: 
  (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such 
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either 
to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law. 
  (2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include 
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial 
conduct. 
Id. 
 51. Hinckley was released from confinement after thirty-five years. See generally 
Spencer S. Hsu & Ann E. Marimow, Would-Be Reagan Assassin John Hinckley Jr. to Be 
Freed After 35 Years, WASH. POST (July 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/public-safety/would-be-reagan-assassin-john-w-hinckley-jr-to-be-freed-after-35-years/ 
2016/07/27/04142084-5015-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html [https://perma.cc/9SPJ-
D6ZL]. 
 52. The federal insanity defense provides: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the 
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and 
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.  Mental disease or defect does not 
otherwise constitute a defense. 
18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2012). 
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insanity by clear and convincing evidence.53  The Federal Rules of 
Evidence were also amended to cabin the testimony of experts in these 
cases, prohibiting them from opining on whether a defendant did or did not 
have the requisite mental state.54  The purpose of these changes was to limit 
the availability and success of the defense.55 
Since IDRA was enacted, a majority of states have followed its lead.56  
Some states have gone further in their restrictions, permitting a defendant to 
raise the defense only when he could not tell whether an act charged was 
right or wrong.57  Finally, a handful of states have eliminated the 
affirmative insanity defense altogether.58  Further encroaching on the 
insanity defense are the “guilty but mentally ill” verdicts,59 which sound 
like a helpful alternative for juries but in reality simply mean the defendant 
goes to prison, where he is unlikely to get very much mental health 
treatment.60 
In the 2006 Clark v. Arizona61 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Arizona’s insanity defense statute, which limited the 
defense to the right-or-wrong test and did not permit evidence of insanity to 
rebut the element of mens rea.62  Noting the great diversity among states in 
 
 53. See id. § 17(b) (“The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by 
clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 54. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an 
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that 
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.  Those matters are for the trier of 
fact alone.”). 
 55. See Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown Into Jail”:  Using Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. 
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 354 (2013) (“There is no question that the Hinckley acquittal 
‘helped legitimize long-standing efforts at both the state and federal levels to abolish or 
reform the defense,’ and that those efforts were, by and large, successful.” (quoting Peter 
Arenella, Reflections on Current Proposals to Abolish or Reform the Insanity Defense, 9 
AM. J.L. & MED 271, 272 (1982))).  While Professor Wright argues the insanity defense is 
“unraveling,” Professor Perlin describes an intentional “shrinking” of the insanity defense. 
Id. at 353–56. 
 56. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750 n.12 (2006) (listing state statutes); see also 
2 THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS:  THE INSANITY DEFENSE, at xi–xvi 
(Jane Campbell Moriarty ed., 2001) (discussing the history of the insanity defense in the 
United States). 
 57. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a) (West 2015) (stating that “[i]t is an 
affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a 
result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong”). 
 58. See Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 n.20 (listing the statutes from Idaho, Kansas, Montana, 
and Utah).    For further explanation of the current national standards governing the insanity 
defense, see Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 885, 925 (2011). 
 59. Clark, 548 U.S. at 752 n.19 (focusing on states’ statutes).  For a thorough analysis of 
“guilty by mentally ill” (GBMI), see Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill 
Verdict:  An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 (1985). 
 60. See Mark A. Woodmansee, Note, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict:  Political 
Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
341, 344–45 (1996) (“In reality, however, GBMI offenders seldom receive mental health 
treatment during the course of their prison sentences.”). 
 61. 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
 62. Id. at 747. 
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crafting the insanity defense, the Court held that the elimination of the full 
M’Naghten standard as a required minimum did not offend a “principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”63  In a footnote, the Court suggested it might go 
further, citing the four states that had eliminated the affirmative defense 
entirely and remarking that although they were not deciding the matter, 
“[w]e have never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, 
nor have we held that the Constitution does not so require.”64  The decision, 
like much contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence, is fractured.  The 
majority opinion, authored by Justice David Souter and joined in full by 
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, was the subject of a strong 
dissent from Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.65  
Justice Breyer concurred in part and dissented in part.66  Time has not 
illuminated the Justices’ view of whether the insanity defense is 
constitutionally mandated. 
In 2013, the Court declined to decide whether the Constitution requires 
an insanity defense when it denied certiorari in the case of Delling v. 
Idaho,67 another case that addressed the constitutionality of a statute 
eliminating the affirmative defense of insanity.  The Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the statute, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case.68  
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented from 
the denial, arguing the Court should address the issue of whether Idaho’s 
modification of the insanity defense is consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.69 
Thus, whether the insanity defense—in any form—is a constitutionally 
protected right is unclear and far from certain.  The Supreme Court has 
refused to decide the matter since its rejection of certiorari in Cowan v. 
Montana70 in 1994, and a shifting majority of the Court seems disinclined 
to protect it under the Due Process Clause.  The defense is a fractured 
concept and of very little use, given the strictures of proof and the 
availability of alternative verdicts, such as guilty but mentally ill.71 
The impact may be negligible if a jurisprudential nail is finally 
hammered into the coffin of the insanity defense, given its vanishingly 
small success rate.72  But if the defense fully withers, the law has no 
 
 63. Id. at 748 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). 
 64. Id. at 752 n.20. 
 65. Id. at 741. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
 70. 511 U.S. 1005 (1994). 
 71. “[T]he most fundamental distinction—that between persons who are legally 
classified as insane, and thus presumably as not bearing criminal moral responsibility, and 
persons not so classified, and thus who are presumably criminally responsible—is in crucial 
respects fraying and unraveling, for good or ill.” Wright, supra note 33, at 241 (arguing that 
the defense is in danger of unraveling for myriad reasons:  legal, scientific, and 
jurisprudential). 
 72. See Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 594. 
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mechanism to address defendants like Andrea Yates, who drowned her five 
children, understanding it was legally wrong but believing in the delusion 
that it was the only way to save their immortal souls.73 
The critical inquiry is whether a jurisprudential commitment exists to 
distinguish between the mentally responsible and the mentally 
nonresponsible who commit criminal acts.  Although existing legislation 
suggests there is little interest in protecting mentally ill defendants from 
being tried and convicted, there seems to be widespread agreement, at least 
in theory, that legal insanity fulfills an essential jurisprudential role with 
respect to certain individuals.  As Professor Stephen Morse puts it: 
Abolition of the insanity defense is simply unfair and there is no adequate 
substitute for it.  Some people are so lacking in rational capacity through 
no fault of their own that it would be as unjust to blame and punish them 
as it would be to blame and punish young children or people with 
dementia.74 
If we remain jurisprudentially and morally committed to the concept of 
legal insanity, neuroscience research may assist in breathing new life into it. 
II.  NEUROSCIENCE AND SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS:  
SCHIZOPHRENIA AS A TEMPLATE 
Medicine relies on multiple forms of structural neuroimaging for 
diagnosis and treatment of illness and trauma.  X-ray, computed 
tomography (CT) scans, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) depict 
brain structure and are widely accepted to diagnose skull fractures, 
traumatic injuries, and brain tumors, for example.75  Functional imaging 
such as functional MRI (fMRI), by contrast, purports to show areas of 
activity and inactivity in the brain.76  Certain types of positron emission 
tomography scans, such as 18 FDG PET, detect glucose metabolism in the 
brain and can diagnose malignancies and neurodegenerative diseases.77  
However, most functional neuroimaging (primarily fMRI) has been used 
essentially for foundational cognitive neuroscience research.78 
 
 73. See Yates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005).  For more, see Deborah W. 
Denno, Who Is Andrea Yates?:  A Short About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 
(2003); Phillip J. Resnick, The Andrea Yates Case:  Insanity on Trial, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
147 (2007); Slobogin, supra note 49. 
 74. See Morse, supra note 58, at 932. 
 75. For more on structural and functional neuroimaging, see generally Bigler et al., 
supra note 6; Robert P. Granacher, Jr., Traumatic Brain Injury, in NEUROIMAGING IN 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 6, at 43. 
 76. An fMRI is used to detect activity and function in the brain and is based upon the 
fact that blood flows to a brain region when neural activity increases. Bigler et al., supra 
note 6, at 32. 
 77. Rushing, Pryma & Langleben, supra note 7, at 19; M. Wintermark et al., Traumatic 
Brain Injury Research Roadmap, 36 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY E12 (2015). 
 78. See, e.g., Wintermark et al., supra note 77. 
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Researchers employ functional neuroscience to study the prediction, 
diagnosis, and treatment of various mental illnesses,79 and there is a 
concerted effort to develop “objective, biologically-based tests for 
psychiatric illnesses.”80  One such area of psychiatric research is 
schizophrenia, a severe mental illness characterized by psychosis, which 
manifests as delusional thinking and hallucinations.  Neuroscientists, 
biologists, geneticists, research psychiatrists, and statisticians—sometimes 
working in concert81—have been contributing to this effort for decades.  
For quite some time, both functional and structural neuroimaging research 
has focused on developing diagnostic markers for predicting82 and imaging 
schizophrenia.83 
Yet, three decades after the original brain scans on schizophrenia, the 
science has not produced a reliable clinical or forensic tool for diagnosis.  
“[N]o consistent or reliable anatomical or functional alterations have been 
unequivocally associated with psychosis or schizophrenia and no clinical 
applications have been developed in psychiatric neuroimaging.”84  A 
working group of the American Psychiatric Association stated in their 
Consensus Report of 2012 that “[d]espite the invaluable leads that the 
neuroimaging studies have provided regarding the neurobiological bases for 
psychiatric disorders, they have yet to impact significantly the diagnosis or 
treatment of individual patients.”85  Although recognizing that neuroscience 
is not yet able to diagnose mental illness using functional imaging, there is 
“considerable effort” being invested to “utilize structural and functional 
MRI for diagnostic purposes in patients with schizophrenia and related 
disorders.”86 
Defendants with schizophrenia and other forms of psychosis often have 
illnesses that fit within the narrow definitions of mental illness required to 
establish a claim of legal insanity.  Proof of a defendant’s delusional state 
 
 79. See generally Jazmin Camchong & Angus W. MacDonald III, Imaging Psychosis:  
Diagnosis and Predication of Violence, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM 
THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 6, at 113. 
 80. Jonathan B. Savitz, Joseph R. Simpson & Wayne C. Drevets, Neuroimaging in 
Affective Disorders:  Application in Clinical Research and Forensic Psychiatry, in 
NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:  FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 
6, at 131. 
 81. See Sekar et al., supra note 11 (a multidisciplinary genetic study investigating 
schizophrenia risk). 
 82. See Philip McGuire et al., Can Neuroimaging Be Used to Predict the Onset of 
Psychosis?, 2 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 1117 (2015) (collecting and discussing the studies and 
need for translation of the findings into clinical care); see also Bendfeldt et al., supra note 
11.  For additional research studies, see, e.g., Dominic E. Job et al., Grey Matter Changes 
over Time in High Risk Subjects Developing Schizophrenia, 25 NEUROIMAGE 1023 (2005), 
and Christos Pantelis et al., Neuroanatomical Abnormalities Before and After Onset of 
Psychosis:  A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal MRI Comparison, 361 LANCET 281 (2003). 
 83. See generally Hugdahl et al., supra note 11; Koutsouleris et al., supra note 11; 
Sukhwinder S. Shergill et al., Mapping Auditory Hallucinations in Schizophrenia Using 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1033 (2000). 
 84. Borgwardt & Fusar-Poli, supra note 10, at 270. 
 85. FIRST ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
 86. Id. at 9. 
2016] SEEING VOICES 613 
of mind, if present at the time of the act, helps to establish the cognitive 
prong of legal insanity.87  Yet fact-finders are rarely persuaded to find a 
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity, even in cases involving ample 
proof of psychosis. 
In a Louisiana case, for example, multiple defense and court-appointed 
experts testified that Salvador Perez was seriously mentally ill and floridly 
delusional when he shot a police officer.88  Perez, a sixty-one-year-old man 
who lived on a small farm in Texas with his wife and five children, told his 
wife he was going out to feed the cows.89  Instead, he put his teenage son in 
the car and began driving furtively across the country, sleeping in fields, all 
under the delusional belief that he was being followed by assassins.90  Perez 
and his son ended their trip in New Orleans with Perez hiding in a shed.91  
Delusionally believing that a police officer was an assassin, Perez tragically 
shot and killed the officer.92 
The prosecutor, who had called no expert witnesses, simply argued in 
closing, “[d]octors, doctors, doctors” and urged the jury to send a message 
that New Orleans does not tolerate cop killers.93  The jury convicted.94  
While this conviction was ultimately vacated several years later, the trial 
was paradigmatically representative of insanity defense cases where the 
jury is skeptical of psychiatric and psychological experts.  Cases like this 
suggest a need for neurological or laboratory-based expert testimony that 
might be more persuasive and less affected by the skepticism that plagues 
behavioral-science testimony.95 
 
 87. A major problem, of course, is neural plasticity:  brain function can change, and a 
current scan does not always reflect the state of the brain at an earlier time. See Glannon, 
supra note 2, at 157 (remarking that scans “cannot provide a retrospective diagnosis of the 
defendant’s neural and mental states at the earlier time”); see also Valerie Gray Hardcastle, 
Traumatic Brain Injury, Neuroscience, and the Legal System, 8 NEUROETHICS 55, 60 (2014) 
(“[B]rains naturally change over time . . . .  A brain scan performed a year or more after a 
crime may provide no information at all regarding the state of the defendant’s brain or mind 
at the time of the alleged crime . . . .”).  Nonetheless, the facts of any given case may suggest 
a history of psychosis and a reasonable inference may be, in a given case, that the delusions 
were present at the time of the crime. 
 88. See Perez v. Cain, 529 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 89. See id. at 590. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 591. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Perez v. Cain, No. 04-1905, 2008 WL 108661, at *17 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2008). 
 94. This conviction was vacated by the district court in a habeas corpus proceeding, and 
that decision was upheld on appeal. See Perez, 529 F.3d 588. 
 95. See Farah, supra, note 40, at 586 (discussing studies showing that people judge 
individuals less harshly when there is a neuroscientific explanation for immoral and criminal 
behavior); Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 4, at 604.  An early mock-jury study found 
neuroimaging evidence itself influential to jurors in an insanity case. See Jessica R. Gurley 
and David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 
26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85 (2008).  My assumption may be too facile and hopeful:  experts will 
likely testify on both sides of a case and the phrase “doctors, doctors, doctors” may be 
replaced by “brain scans, brain scans, brain scans.”  However, if there is better, more 
biologically premised science to support claims of legal insanity than some of the testimony 
that is currently admitted, the defense may meet with less resistance.  Or, as mentioned 
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In a meta-analysis of four experiments, with nearly 1,500 jury-eligible 
participants, designed to test the persuasiveness of neuroimaging in a mens 
rea defense, the results suggested that neuroimages did not affect jurors’ 
judgments, an outcome counterintuitive to many.96  However, the study also 
revealed that expert evidence invoking neurological explanations for the 
defendant’s mental state were “more persuasive than evidence that relied on 
clinical psychological explanation.”97  Fact-finders may well respond more 
favorably to a medical or biologically based explanation of mental illness 
than a psychological one.  It may not be the image that is so persuasive but 
the science behind it that gives jurors comfort. 
Few fact-finders understand severe mental illness involving 
schizophrenia or other forms of psychosis, but their skepticism about 
mental illness and mistrust of clinical psychology may well be tempered by 
neuroscientific evidence, given its close association with medicine.  Most 
people now have great faith in x-rays, CT scans, and MRIs—it is thus likely 
that fact-finders could find neuroimaging explanations well grounded.  If 
future neuroimaging were able to provide biological proof of the auditory 
hallucinations using functional imaging, for example, fact-finders might be 
less distrustful of the behavioral science experts who testify about the 
defendant’s serious mental illness.  Of course, such imaging would provide 
relevant evidence of mental illness and auditory hallucinations; it would not 
prove that the defendant thought the voices were real, that she heard them at 
the time of the incident, or whether she honestly believed she had to obey 
the voices.  But it might be a helpful adjuvant to the behavioral science 
diagnosis. 
III.  THOUGHTS AND BEHAVIORS:  
ILLUMINATING THE DIVIDE? 
In the United States, between 1.7 and 2.5 million traumatic brain injuries 
(TBI) occur every year, with 5 million of those affected individuals 
suffering permanent disability—nearly 2 percent of the U.S. population.98  
A study tracking data from 2002 to 2006 found 275,000 hospitalizations 
and 52,000 deaths from TBI related to falls, car accidents, assaults and 
sports-related injuries.99  Government statistics indicate that more than 12 
 
earlier, legal insanity might not continue as a defense but be evaluated as part of a pretrial 
diversion program. 
 96. N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense:  No 
Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 387–88 (2011). 
 97. Id. at 388. 
 98. MARK FAUL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TRAUMATIC BRAIN 
INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES:  EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND 
DEATHS 2002–2006, at 13, (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/pdf/ 
blue_book.pdf (estimating 1.7 million) [https://perma.cc/M5W5-5B69].  A more recent 
study puts the number at 2.5 million per year in the United States, with 5 million of those 
people living with long-term disability as a result of such injury. Jennifer Hay et al., Chronic 
Traumatic Encephalopathy:  The Neuropathological Legacy of Traumatic Brain Injury, 11 
ANN. REV. PATHOLOGY 21, 22 (2016). 
 99. Wintermark et al., supra note 77, at E13. 
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percent of veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are diagnosed with 
TBI as a result of blast exposure.  This figure, though, may significantly 
underestimate the prevalence of TBI among military members; the correct 
number may be three times greater than the official count.100  TBI is often a 
signature injury of those returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.101 
Ongoing research suggests that certain types of serious brain injury may 
cause disordered thinking, depression, and in some cases, violent behavior 
and even suicide.102  Some data, although controversial, indicate that 
inmates of both sexes may have statistically meaningful higher rates of TBI 
compared to others in the general population.103  Likewise, studies indicate 
that veterans with diagnosed TBI have problems with violent thoughts, 
behaviors, or both.104 
Although multiple research studies examine the relationship between 
brain trauma and violence, the nexus between brain trauma and loss of 
control over behavior is still unclear.105  While some data support the claim 
that “TBI . . . is statistically connected to violent or criminal behavior,”106 it 
is impossible to tell “whether someone was unable to exercise control over 
her conduct at any particular point in time.”107  The relationship among 
impulsivity (often mentioned in the literature on TBI), control over 
behavior, and criminal responsibility is still not well understood, but it 
certainly is a major topic of academic discussion.108 
Commentators note that disinhibition and impulsivity, along with the 
inability to consider future consequences of one’s actions, are hallmarks of 
 
 100. See Hardcastle, supra note 87, at 56. 
 101. Id. 
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prefrontal damage.109  “Frontal lobe damage is associated with an erosion 
of foresight and judgment, and people with such damage often fail to delay 
gratification or experience remorse for their acts.”110  Some scholars, citing 
studies, note that there are structural and functional anomalies in those with 
low impulse control.111  While those with certain types of prefrontal cortex 
damage may show capacity for moral judgment, they may show 
deficiencies when it comes to acting morally.112  Is that a cognitively based 
failure?  A failure of control?  Where and how does thought become 
impulse, and where does impulse become action?113  As difficult as the 
questions are to answer, those relationships are likely to be helped by 
ongoing neuroscience research. 
The research and commentary suggest three areas of ongoing inquiry:  
(1) the relationship between brain lesions and the potential for violent 
behavior; (2) the relationship between impulsivity and control over 
behavior; and (3) whether impaired volition, even if provable at some future 
time, should excuse behavior under some version of insanity defense.114  
Answering these inquiries could be exceptionally helpful for the concept of 
criminal responsibility, which has long adhered to a distinction between 
thought and action without a terribly nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between the concepts. 
A frequently referenced example to showcase how trauma of the 
prefrontal cortex may be correlated with thought and behaviors is the mid-
1800s case of Phineas Gage, a railway worker who suffered a grievous 
injury when a tamping iron (spike) was hurled through his cheek, eye 
socket, and brain due to an explosion at the work site.115  His thinking and 
behavior before and after the injury appeared to vary dramatically.116  
Whereas prior to the injury he was a “responsible, intelligent, and socially 
well-adapted” railroad foreman worker, after the accident he became 
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“irreverent and capricious,” used profanity profusely, and was unreliable 
and irresponsible.117  As quoted by many, “Gage was no longer Gage.”118  
The postincident stories about Gage suggest that his cognitive appreciation 
of right and wrong as well as his behaviors were both affected by the injury.  
Thus, again, the distinction is not always so clear between thoughts and 
actions. 
Neuroscience may more accurately explain the relationship among brain 
lesions (or illnesses), cognition, impulsivity, and behavioral control.  
Historically, the law has embraced a sharp distinction between cognition 
and volition with respect to legal insanity.  Science may help us understand 
whether the sharp demarcation between thoughts and actions is accurate or 
meaningful.  If the relationship between thoughts and actions in the 
seriously mentally ill or injured is better understood, it is possible to redraw 
the map of legal insanity in a way that better comports with scientific 
knowledge, rather than simply following the long-standing separations of 
cognition and volition. 
IV.  NEUROSCIENCE, INSANITY, 
AND MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS 
To return to where we started in this Article, our opinions about 
blameworthiness and mental illness are guided by an internal moral 
compass and are critical to our shared notions of justice.  Yet many have 
argued that legal insanity standards neither reflect an accurate 
understanding of mental illness nor provide a legitimate way to determine 
which defendants are morally blameless. 
In 1954, Judge David Bazelon authored the opinion in Durham v. United 
States,119 rejecting the M’Naghten test and the volitional test as both 
inadequate and too narrow, and replacing it with the so-called “product 
rule,” which stated that “an accused is not criminally responsible if his 
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”120  In that 
remarkable opinion, Judge Bazelon wrote that the “legal and moral 
traditions . . . require that those who, of their own free will and with evil 
intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit acts which violate the law, 
shall be criminally responsible for those acts.”121  At the same time, he also 
noted that “where such acts stem from and are the product of a mental 
disease or defect . . . moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not 
be criminal responsibility.”122  The lesson from this 1954 test still 
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resonates:  to retain its legitimacy, moral blameworthiness in the law must 
keep pace with scientific knowledge. 
Neuroscience may help improve opinions about blameworthiness by 
providing more science-based support for diagnoses, as happened with the 
nurses discussed at the beginning of this Article.  And neuroscience may 
also encourage the judicial system to reject the stereotypes and myths that 
have shaped our current insanity defense doctrines and embrace a more 
humane way of dealing with the mentally ill and brain-injured criminal 
defendants.  As Professor Theodore Blumoff urges, “[s]uch wrongdoers 
usually require incapacitation and always require rehabilitation, but they do 
not necessarily deserve punishment and blame in the hell-holes that 
constitute our prison system.”123 
CONCLUSION 
The research on the effects of neuroscientific explanations for the mens 
rea defense and the insanity defense demonstrate the positive potential of 
neuroscience to improve decision making in response to such defenses.124  
In time, perhaps, the research can shed more light on serious mental illness, 
the relationship between thought and action, and concepts involving 
impulsivity and control of behavior.  The amount of research on these 
issues is staggering and, with hope, will be illuminating and useful for a 
reconstruction of the doctrine of legal insanity that will more accurately 
define moral blameworthiness. 
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